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DAMAI

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Monitoring Report on 'Hate Speech', Information Manipulation, risks to freedom of expression and election integrity in the 2024 Election Period

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1. Introduction

The following edition of Damai Coalition's monitoring report of the 2024 election period covers two main aims: 1) monitor trends of 'disinformation' and 'hate speech'[1], and 2) to monitor the social media behavior of election participants and Election Monitoring Bodies (EMBs).

On January 21, 2024, the Election Supervisory Body (Bawaslu) and the Damai Coalition, together with 11 political parties participating in the election and three pairs of presidential candidates signed the Joint Commitment for Election Campaigning on Social Media for the 2024 Indonesian Elections[2]. Through this joint commitment, the parties commit to comply with the online political campaign rules as according to the Election Law, to fight against disinformation, identity discrimination and hate speech, and to maintain transparency of political information and advertisements.

The following report monitors political parties and candidates' compliance with the online political campaign rules, as well as the signed joint commitment. The monitoring period covered in this report is the cooling period[3] until after election day (11th to 15th of February).

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[1] While we refer to the concepts of 'hate speech' and 'disinformation' in this report, they do not have any internationally agreed definition. Any restrictions on these types of speech must comply with the three-part test under Article 19(3) of the ICCPR.1 The falsity of information is not per se a basis for restrictions unless it is connected to one of the legitimate aims listed in the three-part test, such as the protection of public health or national security.

[2] This Joint Commitment was drafted by the Damai Coalition with the aim of upholding freedom of expression, establishing a peaceful, inclusive and transparent elections, as well as safeguarding against 'disinformation' and 'hate speech'. The Joint Commitment is available here: https://koalisidamai.id/en/joint-commitment-on-the-code-of-ethics-for-election-campaigning-on-social-media-for-the-2024-indonesian-elections-2/

[3] Cooling period is a non campaign period. The cooling period lasts for three days before election day. Based on Election Law, campaigning in the cooling period is forbidden and is an election violation.

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Key Findings
- Lack of registered social media accounts of election participants to the election commission (KPU). KPU regulation on General Election Campaign stipulates that each election participant[4] should register maximum of 20 social media accounts used for election campaigns on each social media platform. But, based on the list of official social media accounts submitted by election participants to the KPU, none of the election participants submitted up to 20 accounts per social media. This has an impact on the lack of supervision that can be conducted by Bawaslu.
- Content considered as "campaigning" was still shared during the cooling period
- Vulnerable groups targeted by 'hate speech' during the cooling period

During the monitoring period, EMBs used social media as a tool to disseminate information to the public. Information provided did not only entail details specifically regarding voting procedures, but also warnings of possible electoral fraud and reports of ongoing irregularities found in the electoral process.

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[4] Election participants in this case includes candidates in the presidential election, political parties in the legislative election, as well as candidates in the senate election.

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2. Election Participants

2.1. Few Campaign Accounts Registered to the KPU

Article 37 paragraph 2 of the General Election Commission Regulation or PKPU Number 15 of 2023 concerning the General Election Campaign stipulates that each election participant can create a maximum of 20 social media accounts for each social media platform. But, based on the list of official social media accounts submitted by election participants to the Election Commission or KPU, then forwarded to the Election Supervisory Body or Bawaslu, none of the election participants submitted up to 20 accounts per social media.

Table 1. List of Social Media Accounts in the Presidential Election

Social media platform	ANIES RASYID BASWEDAN - A. MUHAIMIN ISKANDAR	PRABOWO SUBIANTO - GIBRAN RAKABUMING RAKA	GANJAR PRANOWO - Moh. Mahfud MD
Facebook	1. Anies Baswedan	1. Prabowo Subianto	1. Ganjarku
	2. A Muhaimin Iskandar		2. Ganjar Pedia
			3. Jejak Ganjar
			4. Saka Nusantara
			5. TPN Ganjar Mahfud
			6. Fans Ganjar-Mahfud TPD Sultra

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			7. ANDISUMANGERUKKA.ASR87
Instagram	**1. Anies Baswedan**	**1. Prabowo**	**1. Ganjarku**
	2. A Muhaimin Iskandar		**2. Lapak Ganjar**
	3. AMIN Aja Dulu		**3. Jejak Ganjar**
			4. Muslim Ganjar
			5. TPN Ganjar Mahfud
			6. Perjuangan_rakyat _sultra
			7. ANDISUMANGERUKKA87
X	**1. Anies Baswedan**	**1. Prabowo**	**1. Ganjarku**
	2. A Muhaimin Iskandar		**2. Ganjar Pedia**
	3. AMIN Aja Dulu		**3. Saka Nusantara**
			4. Muslim Ganjar
			5. TPN Ganjar Mahfud
YouTube	**1. Anies Baswedan**	**None registered**	**1. Ganjarku**

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	2. AMIN Aja Dulu		**2. Ganjar Pedia**
			3. Lapak Ganjar
			4. Jejak Ganjar
			5. Saka Nusantara
			6. Muslim Ganjar
TikTok	**1. Anies Baswedan**	**None registered**	**1. Ganjarku**
	2. A Muhaimin Iskandar		**2. Ganjar Pedia**
	3. AMIN Aja Dulu		**3. Lapak Ganjar**
			4. Jejak Ganjar
			5. Saka Nusantara
			6. Muslim Ganjar
			7. TPN Ganjar Mahfud
			8. tiktokfans_gama_s ultra
			9. ANDISUMANGERUK KA87

In the presidential election, candidate pair number 1, Anies Baswedan-Muhaimin Iskandar, only reported a maximum of three social media accounts. The AMIN Aja Dulu account is used to campaign on Instagram, X, and TikTok. On YouTube, the AMIN Aja Dulu account has never posted any videos.

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Meanwhile, candidate pair number 2, Prabowo Subianto-Gibran Rakabuming Raka only submitted one account on Facebook, Instagram, and X, namely Prabowo's official account. No Youtube and TikTok accounts were submitted to the KPU, even though Prabowo has a YouTube account @djojohadikusumo with 85.7K subscribers that has been active since 15 years, and also has a TikTok account with the username prabowosubianto08 with 730.8K subscribers and a total of 3.5 million likes.

None of the accounts belonging to Prabowo's vice presidential candidate, Gibran Rakabuming, is registered in the campaign account registration documents to the KPU. However, Gibran maintains an Instagram account gibran_rakabuming_ with 5 million followers, a YouTube account @GibranTV with a total subscriber of 76.6K and a total of 478 videos, which has been active since March 2020, and a TikTok account gibran_rakabuming with 3.3 million subscribers and his posts have been liked 41.1 million times.

Candidate pair number 3, Ganjar Pranowo-Mahfud MD, submitted five to nine campaign accounts per social media. However, the candidate's official account was not submitted. Ganjar Pranowo has official Facebook, Instagram, X, Youtube, and TikTok accounts. Mahfud MD has official Facebook, Instagram, and X accounts.

The registration of official campaign accounts can help Bawaslu and election observers monitor presidential candidates' campaign activities during the campaign period, cooling period, and voting day, along with political campaign advertisements paid to the platform. As such, alleged violations of the election rules can be reported to Bawaslu as campaign breaches. Despite this, presidential candidates did not report all social media accounts which in reality are managed and mobilized by their

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campaign teams, likely by utilizing the accountability gap presented by the PKPU.

A similar situation has occurred with regard to the Legislative Elections (Pileg). The majority of political parties participating in the election only submitted one campaign account per social media, namely the official political party account. No legislative candidate accounts were registered. In fact, in an open proportional election system, candidates campaign for themselves.

Table 2. List of Social Media Accounts in Legislative Elections

No.	Political party	Facebook	Instagram	X	Youtube	TikTok
1.	PKB	1. DPP PKB	1. DPP PKB	1. DPP_PKB	dpp_pkb	dpp_pkb
2.	Gerindra	1. Partai Gerakan Indonesia Raya (Gerindra)	1. Gerindra	1. Gerindra	1. GerindraTV	1. Partaigerindra
3.	PDIP	1. PDI Perjuangan	1. pdiperjuangan	1. PDI_Perjuangan	1. PDI Perjuangan	1. dpppdiperjuangan
4.	Golkar	1. Golkar Indonesia	1. golkar.indonesia	1. golkar_id	1. Golkar Indonesia	1. Golkar Indonesia
			2. Golkar Indonesia			
5.	NasDem	1. Partai NasDem	1. Official_nasdem	1. nasdem	1. NasDem TV	1. partainasdem
6.	Partai Buruh	1. Partai Buruh	1. partaiburuh_	1. excopartaiburuh	1. Partai Buruh	1. Partai Buruh
7.	Gelora	1. pilihgelora	1. pilihgelora	1. pilihgelora	-	1. pilihgelora

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#	Party					
8.	PKS	1. Partai Keadilan Sejahtera	1. pk_sejahtera 2. PKS Muda 3. fraksipksdprri	1. pksejahtera 2. FPKSDPRRI	1. PKS TV 2. PKSTV DPR RI	1. pksejahtera 2. fraksipksdprri
		2. Fraksi PKS DPR RI				
9.	PKN	1. Kitapknid	1. Kitapknid	1. Kitapknid	-	1. Kitapknid
		2. Pimnaspkn	2. Pimnaspkn	2. Pimnaspkn		2. Pimnaspkn
		3. Pknnewsroom	3. Pknnewsroom	3. Pknnewsroom		3. Pknnewsroom
10.	Hanura	-	1. BAPPILU DPP HANURA	1. hanura.official	1. HANURA TV	1. BAPPILU DPP HANURA OFFICIAL
			2. hanura.official			2. hanura.official
11.	Garuda	1. Partai Garuda	1. Partai Garuda	-	1. Partai Garuda	1. partaigarudaofficial
12.	PAN	1. Partai Amanat Nasional-PAN	1. amanatnasional	1. Official_PAN	1. PAN TV	1. amanat_nasional
13.	PBB	1. partaibulanbintang.official	1. partaibulanbintang.official	1. OfficialDPP_PBB	1. PBB Channel Official	-
14.	Demokrat	1. Partai Demokrat	1. Partai Demokrat	1. Partai Demokrat	1. Partai Demokrat	1. Partai Demokrat
15.	PSI	1. PARTAI SOLIDARITAS INDONESIA	1. PARTAI SOLIDARITAS INDONESIA	-	1. PARTAI SOLIDARITAS INDONESIA	1. PARTAI SOLIDARITAS INDONESIA

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16.	Perindo	1. Hidup Untuk Indonesia	1. Pejuang.Sejahtera	1. Juang.Sejahtera	1. Pejuang Sejahtera	1. Pejuang.Sejahtera
17.	PPP	1. DPP PPP	1. DPP.PPP	1. DPP_PPP	1. PETIGA TV	1. DPP PPP
18.	Partai Ummat	1. Partai UMMAT Indonesia	1. partaiummatofficial	1. realAmienRais	1. Partai Ummat Official	1. partaiummatofficial
		2. ummatmenang	2. ridhorahmadiofficial	2. RidhoRahmadi85	2. Ridho Rahmadi Official	2. realridhorahmadi
		3. Partai UMMAT	3. amienraisofficial	3. DPP_Partai Ummat	3. Amien Rais Official	3. Amien Rais Official
			4. ummatmenang	4. ummatmenang	4. ummatmenang	4. ummatmenang

Six political parties also omitted to register social media accounts on certain platforms. Hati Nurani Rakyat Party or Hanura has a [Partai Hanura](#) Facebook account. Garda Republik Indonesia Party or Garuda has a [DPP Partai Garuda](#) X account since June 2016. The Gelombang Rakyat Indonesia Party or Gelora has a Gelora Indonesia Youtube account since December 2019 and has been followed by 8.06K subscribers. Kebangkitan Nusantara Party or PKN has a Youtube account for [Partai Kebangkitan Nusantara](#) since October 2021. PBB has a TikTok account under the name [bappilu_pbb](#). Solidaritas Indonesia Party or PSI has an X [DPP PSI](#) account since March 2015.

The lack of campaign accounts submitted to Election Management Bodies for supervision by the Bawaslu leads to two conclusions. *Firstly*, there seems to have been a lack of commitment from election participants to the principle of campaign accountability. The submission of all social media campaign accounts can help to assess the amount of campaign

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cost on social media, but with so few accounts submitted, it is difficult to estimate it.

Moreover, if we look at the political advertising data made available by Meta through the Meta Ad Library, many political advertisements are posted by accounts and pages that are not registered by election participants to the KPU. For example, the page of Agus Yudhoyono, Chairman of the Democratic Party, was not submitted to the KPU. In fact, during the last 90 days since April 2, 2024, this page has spent Rp1,178,989,291 on political advertisements. Then the page of Sandiaga Salahuddin Uno, Head of the Election Campaign Committee of the United Development Party (PPP) who was not registered with the KPU, spent money on political advertisements totaling Rp631,717,456. Similarly, the Ganjar & Mahfud Menangkan 2024 page advertised Rp359,348,043, Anies' Unboxing page Rp150,260,573, Grace Natalie's page Rp131,141,981, and Golkar 2024 – Rp111,884,139.

Secondly, the lack of campaign accounts submitted to the KPU also shows that the rule limiting the campaign accounts of election participants to 20 accounts per social media is not relevant to holding election participants accountable for negative campaigns, including disinformation campaigns and other types of influence operations aiming to promote certain candidates or discredit others. A more relevant rule would be to require all election participants to register all accounts and pages that are managed and mobilized through the use of their campaign funds and require such spending to be reported to KPU. As such, KPU and election observers will have more useful information to conduct a thorough evaluation of election participants' compliance with election rules regarding social media campaigns and campaign financing.

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2.2. Behavior of Official Accounts of Election Participants during the Cooling Period and Voting Day

There are five categories of content identified that were posted by the election participants during the cooling period (February 11 to 13). *First*, in posts from the account of an election participant, the account of a family/party member, or a campaign account about the election participant, **campaign material, i.e. self-image, can be implicitly found**. The social media account @aminajaduluid posted a portrait of Jakarta's development under Governor Anies Baswedan. Prabowo's TikTok account posted a video with the narrative "Estafet Kebaikan #BersamaIndonesiaMaju" along with dozens of videos of artists and influencers socializing how to vote for ballots with a veiled tendency to vote for 02. GanjarKu's YouTube account posted a video testimony from Ganjar's wife, Siti Atikoh, that Ganjar is a kind and responsible person. GanjarKu YouTube even posted a short movie titled "Cinta Tapi Cinta" which tells the love story of Ganjar and Atikoh.

Figure 1. Veiled campaign posts of candidate pairs 01, 02, and 03 during the cooling period.

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For political parties, **content that implicitly promotes** certain parties was also found. The YouTube account pbbchannelofficial, for example, published a discussion video of a meeting with Benny Rusma, candidate number 2 for Bekasi City Local Parliament covering Jati Sampurna, Jati Asih, and Pondok Melati electoral district. The DPP Democratic Party Facebook account posted quotes from Democratic Party leaders related to the election, such as the Chairman of the Democratic Party, Agus Harimurti Yudhoyono (AHY), Democratic Party candidates on behalf of Ongku P. Hasibuan, Edhie Baskoro Yudhoyono, Jensen Sitindaon, and others.

Figure 2. Facebook post of the DPP Democratic Party on February 13.

The second category is **posts that explicitly promote election participants, and there are even calls to vote**. For example, the

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Instagram account @aminajaduluid posts content on why it is necessary to vote for the Amin. The DPP PKB Facebook account calls for voting for Amin. GanjarKu's YouTube account posts video testimonials of voters abroad who have voted for Ganjar because of Ganjar's good vision and mission and believe that Ganjar-Mahfud can realize the work program. JejakGanjar YouTube account frequently posts Ganjar-Mahfud's vision and mission. The Ganjar Pedia Facebook account also wrote "This is the spirit that makes us all on fire. VOTE NO 3, Ganjar-Mahfud MD". Then, Golkar Indonesia's Facebook account posted "Prabowo-Gibran one round!!!". Also found on the Garuda Party's YouTube account is a video inviting voters to cast their voting rights, but at the end of the video, there is the Garuda Party's serial number, which is number 11, and a photo of two Garuda Party figures.

Figure 3. Ganjar Pedia's Facebook post on February 11.

The third category is **posts about past campaign activities**. These posts were the most commonly shared during the cooling period on social media, both spread by officially registered and unregistered accounts. The

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Instagram account @ubahbareng, not registered with the KPU, posted a playlist of Anies' Desak event.

The fourth category is **neutral posts where no campaign elements or self-promoting image are found**. For example, inviting voters to use their voting rights, overseeing votes at polling stations, disseminating information regarding prohibited actions at polling stations, and activities carried out by election participants in the quiet period, such as removing campaign props. Similar posts were also identified on election day.

Several political parties were also observed consolidating on social media. Political party instructions to party members at lower ranks can be found on various platforms. Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (PDIP), for example, directed its cadres to optimize party offices and consolidate witnesses to guard the process of voting, counting, and recapitulation. Partai Solidaritas Indonesia (PSI) also asked party offices to be open 24 hours to interact with the constituents.

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
Figure 4. Posts of PDIP (left) and PSI (right) instructions to party cadres ahead of the February 14 vote.

The fifth category of content are **posts that narrate the existence of election fraud** (such as intimidation of campaign teams by police officers, violations of bureaucratic neutrality, and politicization of social aid), and report the fraud. The X official accounts @CakImiNOW, @dpp_pkb, @aminajaduluid often post these issues. Some politicians and influencers promoted the documentary film "Dirty Vote" which was published on YouTube during the cooling period. The film uncovered information regarding anomalies and possible acts of electoral fraud in the 2024 elections. Narratives about election fraud and the Dirty Vote film were also posted by AmienRaisOfficial and Ummat Party social media

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accounts. Candidate 01's campaign accounts that are not registered with the KPU also spread the narrative, such as the Instagram accounts @relawannusantaraaniesmuhaimin and @aminmuda_sumut.

Figure 5. Muhaimin Iskandar's official account posts on X (left) and Facebook (right) regarding the movie Dirty Vote.

In contrast, the camp of the election participants mentioned in the Dirty Vote film as the ones who committed fraud made their social media a medium to clarify or spread counter-narratives. They claimed that the film was slander, political propaganda, and a form of black campaign. The counter-narrative can be seen on posts by the OfficialDPP_PBB Twitter account and Golkar Indonesia's Facebook account.

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Figure 6. Posts from Golkar Indonesia's Facebook account (left) and Partai Bulan Bintang 's X account (right) responding to the Dirty Vote.

Meanwhile, on the voting day and the day after, three trending topics were found. First, the **invitation to oversee the counting process** at polling stations and the multi-level manual recapitulation process directed toward voters, supporters, and the public. Often, election participants' accounts are still found inviting voters to vote for them. One of them was carried out by the Instagram account @aminajaduluid.

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Figure 7. Instagram account post @aminajaduluid on February 14.

Second, **activities on voting day**. Election participants posted photos and videos of themselves preparing to vote at the polling station, the process at the polling station, and activities after casting their voting rights. Posts thanking voters who have voted for them and volunteers who have protected the votes are also commonly found on the accounts of election participants. On the candidate pair 02 team, the individual social media accounts of the presidential and vice presidential candidates, as well as all supporting parties, were busy posting the Prabowo-Gibran victory declaration at Istora Senayan. Meanwhile, the social media accounts of candidates 01 and 03 posted content narrating that their respective teams would continue to guard the votes and wait for the results of the KPU's multi-level manual recapitulation.

Figure 8. Instagram account @prabowo's post regarding Prabowo Gibran's victory declaration on February 15.

The third topic is findings of **violations or irregularities on voting day**. The social media account relawan_amin.01 published a photo of ballots cast at a polling station in Tegal for candidate pair 02. The Labor Party X account reported an announcement paper posted at the polling station that the Labor Party was annulled in the election.

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"The writing that the Labor Party was annulled was allegedly deliberately posted at the polling station. The Labor Party is very disadvantaged and strongly condemns actions like this. People who were going to vote for the Labor Party ended up undoing their intentions because of the announcement that the Labor Party was annulled," wrote the X @EXCOPARTAIBURUH account on February 14, at 2:52 PM.

Figure 9. Post of X account @EXCOPARTAIBURUH reporting acts of malicious slander against the Labor Party at a polling station.

KPU bans all candidates and political parties from holding rallies or campaigning on any platform during the election cooling-off period. All community members are also prohibited from verbally encouraging or discouraging voters or using any other means to influence them during the quiet period leading up to election day. The regulation also extends

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to media companies, pollsters, and social media accounts, which are forbidden from broadcasting or publishing content favoring or attacking candidates. Any violation of these rules can be deemed a criminal offense, carrying penalties of up to four years in prison and a maximum fine of Rp 48 million.

Despite the ban, the findings above showcase that election participants, their supporters, political parties, and members of the public still violated the no-campaign regulation either implicitly or explicitly. Many times, more covert campaign content is spread by accounts that are not registered by election participants to the KPU. The findings further call for addressing the accountability gaps in PKPU, particularly regarding social media campaigns and campaign financing. Despite findings of violating posts by members of the public, election participants and political parties should be held to higher accountability standards concerning violation of no-campaign regulation during the cooling-off period.

3. Digital Attacks

3.1. Information manipulation/disinformation Monitoring

During the monitoring period (11-15 February), Mafindo has fact-checked a total of 23 posts. After further examination, some of the original posts were found to have been uploaded during the previous period and were subsequently removed from the data. Furthermore, by extending the observation period to two weeks after the polling day, several posts that were actually uploaded during the monitoring period were found, but the clarification articles were published 1 to 2 weeks later. This observation resulted in the identification of 24 posts of election-related disinformation. A majority of these were found on Whatsapp (7), then on TikTok (4), Twitter/X (4), Facebook (4) Youtube (4), and Instagram (1). 66,7% of the

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posts (16 posts) were categorized as misleading contents (misuse of information to frame an issue or an individual), 3 posts as fabricated contents (materials that are entirely false and being made up), 1 post as false context (a content that is genuine but has been reframed in dangerous ways), and 1 post as satire/parody. The most targeted by disinformation during this monitoring period were candidates (18 posts), followed by Electoral Management Bodies (EMB) (3 posts), incumbent (2), and politicians (1). During the monitoring period, three trends of disinformation circulated; 1) false information regarding the support of key opinion leaders towards candidates, 2) false information about the candidates and their supporters, including negative character traits, identity, or poor performance, and 3) false information regarding the electoral process and issues targeting EMBs.

3.1.1. Enticing Support for Candidates
A series of posts during this monitoring period showcases support towards candidates from key opinion leaders.

Examples:
1. The day before election day (13 February 2024), [an AI generated video](#) was shared on a Whatsapp group chat claiming that the former President of the United States, Barack Obama, supports the presidential candidate, Anies Baswedan.
2. The day after election day (15 February 2024), [a WhatsApp chain message](#) claimed that the King of Saudi Arabia promises to give land use rights to Indonesia if Anies Baswedan is elected president.

3.1.2. Disinformation regarding negative character traits, identity, or poor performance of the candidates and their supporters.

Examples:

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1. On February 11, a [Facebook account](#) posted a snippet of candidate 01's campaign video at JIS with the claim that there were no national flags in the campaign. However, the full video shows the presence of red and white flags. The absence of a national flag in Indonesia is considered a lack of nationalism. The post aims to frame candidate 01 as unpatriotic.

2. On February 12, 2024, [a TikTok account](#) posted a snippet of video with a claim that it was a leaked recording of Prabowo's voice demeaning the Indonesian nation. In fact, the claim of a leaked recording of Prabowo's voice is untrue. The audio used is a segment from a talk show on television titled "One Hour Closer with Prabowo." The context of the conversation snippet is when Prabowo was giving examples of racialism that occurred to Indonesians.

3.1.3. Disinformation regarding electoral process and targeting Electoral Management Bodies (EMBs) or the KPU and the Bawaslu

A series of posts during this monitoring period spread false information regarding EMBs.

Examples:
1. Election day is held nationally on February 14th, however, election day for Indonesian citizens who live abroad is a couple of days earlier. Due to this, a number of posts circulated regarding premature vote counting, when in fact, vote counting overall is done together on February 14th. [A video on Tiktok](#) reported that voting stations overseas have prematurely counted votes and [another video on TikTok](#) claimed that the candidate pair Prabowo and Gibran Rakabuming has won by a landslide in multiple countries.

2. [A Tiktok post](#) claimed that the members of the ad hoc body of the KPU (General Elections Committee), the voting organizing group

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(KPPS), will be rewarded with an overseas cruise trip after the elections. This issue is false, instead, member of the group are given a salary for their work in preparation of, and during, election day.

3. [A circulating video on Whatsapp group chats](#) claimed election fraud had taken place in Madura where ballots were already marked. The claim that ballots have been marked prior to voting is not true, This was followed [by further misleading claims](#) that the polling station officers (KPPS) had been attacked by angry members of the public due to the alleged fraud.

3.2. Monitoring of content targeting vulnerable groups

We refer to vulnerable groups in this report as communities or segments of society with limited access to resources, often marginalized and perceived as antagonistic entities, leading to their isolation and hindrance in realizing their full human potential. Alternatively, another definition posits that vulnerable groups are those entitled to receive preferential treatment and protection due to their unique characteristics. However, owing to their distinctiveness and minority status, vulnerable groups frequently encounter discrimination and hate speech from diverse sources.

During the cooling period leading up to the general election (11-15 February 2024), content targeting vulnerable groups persisted, encompassing issues such as racial discrimination, religious or belief minorities, disability groups, gender minorities, women, Rohingya, activists, and journalists. Data collection in this domain was conducted through the hate speech monitoring dashboard website operated by the Alliance of Independent Journalists. This involved scraping content from various platforms such as Instagram and Facebook, utilizing each vulnerable group as a keyword for data retrieval. In addition to employing

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Artificial Intelligence for assistance, the data collection process engaged 17 annotators representing diverse backgrounds.

The categories of hate speech used in our research encompass: (i) Content that threatens or incites violence, (ii) Offensive content, (iii) Content containing identity attacks, (iv) Content with sexual connotations, (v) Content containing obscene language and profanity. Overall, the hate speech recorded on the Alliance of Independent Journalists (AJI) website is comprehensive and includes instances falling under these aforementioned categories.

Count of Hate Speech Types

Figure 10. Number of hate speech related to the 2024 Election (Source: AJI)

The data was collected during the period of February 11th to February 15th, 2024, spanning the cooling period preceding the general election until voting day and one day thereafter. The hate speech content found related to the 2024 elections are categorized into at least six distinct categories. These categories and their respective upload counts are as follows: insulting (1220 uploads), profanity and obscenity (380 uploads), identity attacks (302 uploads), , threats or incitement (189 uploads), others (83 uploads), sexual content (1 upload). The posts included in this

data collection were sourced from various platforms, with a particular focus on content distributed across Facebook, X, Instagram and cekfakta.com.


Figure 11. Distribution of vulnerable groups who are targets of hate speech (Source: AJI)

The diagram illustrates that 'hate speech' targets various groups, with the majority directed towards individuals with disabilities (1062 posts). Notably, individuals with mental disabilities are frequently subjected to hate speech during this election season. This trend mirrors the ongoing controversy surrounding the participation of people with mental disorders in exercising their voting rights during general elections. The third biggest group to be targeted during this period is the ethnic Chinese minority (123 posts) and the fourth is the LGBTQ+ community (16 posts). Furthermore, 'hate speech' targeting religious minority groups is evident. Due to the ongoing geopolitical Israel-Palestine conflict, the dashboard found 141 posts of 'hate speech' related to the elections that are targeted towards the Jewish community. Additionally, 15 posts target Christians and 2 target Syiah.

The following are some examples of 'hate speech' towards vulnerable groups in Indonesia found during the monitoring period (11-15 February 2024).

3.2.1. Hate speech against Refugees/Immigrants

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
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Figure 12. Examples of hate speech towards Rohingya refugees.

One instance of content targeting vulnerable groups involves the arrival of Rohingya refugees in December 2023. Across various social media platforms, numerous parody videos mocking Rohingya refugees have surfaced. One notable example is comedian Marshel Widianto, who posted a TikTok video parodying Rohingya refugees, suggesting that their plight was being exploited for sympathy as a form of colonization.

Furthermore, many netizens created fake UNHCR Indonesia accounts to post comments on Marshel's TikTok video, insinuating that Rohingya refugees would receive unwarranted benefits such as shelter, housing, food, and even Indonesian Identity Cards. These posts and comments were widely disseminated on Platform X, reaching approximately 2,654,000 other accounts. Notably, the @ARSIPAJA account, which is quite renowned on the platform, played a significant role in the dissemination of this content.

It is crucial to highlight that such accusations against Rohingya refugees receiving excessive support are baseless and unfounded. This underscores the prevalence of misinformation and 'fake news' circulating on social

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media platforms. The sensitive nature of the issue of granting Resident Identity Cards (KTP) was evident during the election momentum from 2014 to 2019. During this period, fake news circulated regarding Chinese nationals allegedly obtaining Indonesian Identity Cards and participating in elections. This misinformation led to unrest, including a riot in front of the Bawaslu office in 2019, where fake news played a significant role as one of the triggers.

Similarly, news targeting Rohingya refugees with similar unfounded claims has the potential to incite similar unrest and social tensions. Therefore, it is imperative to address and counteract the spread of misinformation targeting vulnerable groups to prevent the escalation of societal discord and potential violence.

### 3.2.2. Hate Speech Against Former Political Prisoners

Figure 13. examples of hate speech and misinformation targeting former 1965 political prisoners

The upload described above, which occurred on Facebook, contains hate speech targeting the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) using the hashtag #GanyangPKI. Additionally, the upload calls for the arrest and trial of Joko Widodo, alleging his affiliation with the Indonesian Communist Party. Furthermore, accusations against candidate pair 02 are made, culminating in a call to dismantle the purported "fake diploma regime," referencing Gibran Rakabuming Raka's alleged possession of a fake diploma. The post also asserts that it is forbidden (haram) to vote for a candidate pair deemed unbelieving, unethical, and incompetent, referring derogatorily to candidate pair 02.

In response, it is essential to highlight that the Indonesian Communist Party was disbanded on March 12, 1996, through Presidential Decree No 1/3/1996. Therefore, accusations suggesting Joko Widodo's affiliation with the Indonesian Communist Party lack substantiation. Similarly, allegations regarding Gibran's possession of a fake diploma remain unproven.

The dissemination of such misinformation contributes to the distortion of public discourse and undermines the integrity of the electoral process. It is crucial for individuals to critically evaluate information and refrain from spreading unfounded accusations or engaging in hate speech, which can perpetuate division and discord within society.

4. Popular Online Public Conversations in the Cooling Period, Voting Day and One Day After

Based on the Damai Coalition's monitoring, there were five hashtags that were most popular during the quiet period, the voting day, and one day after the voting, namely #Sirekap, #dirtyvote, #kecuranganpemilu, #KamiKabarkanYouPutuskan, and #pdiperjuangan. The following is an overview of the distribution of the five hashtags.

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Tabel 3. 5 Top Hashtags during 11-15 Februari 2024 Period

Top Hashtags During The Cooling Period			
Hashtag	𝕏 Reposts	Facebook Shares	TikTok Views
#Sirekap	93,001	1,350	9,260,495
#dirtyvote	85,000	3,000	11,000,000
#kecuranganpemilu	800	170	23,000,000
#KamiKabarkanAndaPutuskan	10,600	200	20,000,000
#pdiperjuangan	1,300	430	74,000,000

Table 3 shows that #Sirekap was the most used hashtag on platform X during the monitoring period. Sirekap is an electronic vote recapitulation system managed by the KPU. This system is intended to enhance transparency and efficiency in the recapitulation process. Since @narasitv's post on X about Sirekap on February 9, conversations about Sirekap have gone viral.

Based on Drone Emprit's analysis of data on X during the period February 14-15, conversations about Sirekap revolved around data conversion errors, data discrepancies between C-Result photos and data displayed in infopemilu.kpu.go.id, opinions of fraud in the system, application shortcomings, lack of transparency in displaying election data, criticism of data integrity, netizen concerns about Sirekap's cybersecurity, and personal experiences of Sirekap users in the field. Not surprisingly, #Sirekap became the most talked about hashtag on X.

MONITORING REPORT ON 'HATE SPEECH',INFORMATION MANIPULATION, RISKS TO FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND ELECTION INTEGRITY IN THE 2024 ELECTION PERIOD

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Figure 14. The most retweeted post on X regarding Sirekap. Source: Drone Emprit.

The second most popular hashtag on X, also the most shared on Facebook during the monitoring period was #dirtyvote. Dirty Vote is a documentary film produced by Watchdoc. This film contains an analysis on cases of fraud in the 2024 elections by three constitutional law experts in Indonesia. Published during the cooling period on February 11th, the film has garnered 9,8 million views on the official Dirty Vote Youtube account.

Based on Drone Emprit's analysis of discourse regarding "Dirty Vote" during the period of February 10-12, negative and positive sentiments in conversations are almost balanced. In the positive narrative, the film is praised for being able to present factual data on election fraud, reveal the flaws in the election system, as a call for the public to oversee the election process and use voting rights, as well as an expression of defense for the three constitutional law experts who appear in the film.

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The film was promoted by many significant actors, including media outlets Tempo and CNN Indonesia, activists such as Tunggal Pawestri, Alissa Wahid and Ananda Badudu, Nahdlatul Ulama figure Islah Bahrawi, civil society organization @antikorupsi, active supporters of candidate 01 @Mdy_Asmara1701 and @BosPurwa, film review account @HabisNontonFilm, as well as by the account of vice president 01, namely @cakimiNOW, and the official campaign account of candidate 01, @aminajaduluid.


Figure 15. Positive narrative about Dirty Vote on X. Source: Drone Emprit.

Meanwhile, some also criticised the documentary. Some described it as slander against the government of President Jokowi Widodo and Prabowo, dirty propaganda, imbalanced in presenting facts, exacerbating polarization, disrupting the democratic process, creating uproar and worsening the atmosphere during the cooling period, and creating confusion in public. X accounts that counter-narrate Dirty Vote include @OfficialDPP_PBB, Deputy Chairman of the Gerindra Party

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@habiburokhman, Prabowo Gibran's campaign account @dekade_08, Prabowo Gibran's supporting buzzers @PartaiSocmed and @Bull_winner, and Gerindra Party politician @fadlizon.

Figure 16. Counter-narrative to #dirtyvote on X by Prabowo Gibran supporting accounts.

#Dirtyvote was also the third most used hashtag on TikTok during the monitoring period. The TikTok account @dekade_08, an active supporter for Prabowo Gibran, was the most popular account in the Dirty Vote conversation. In the counter-narrative he wrote, the Dirty Vote movie should be suspected as an attempt to provoke the public because it was published during the cooling period. In his counter-narrative post, @dekade_08 also used #prabowogibran #bersamaindonesiamaju #mendingprabowo, and #terusmajubersamaprabowo hashtags. This post was viewed 3.1 million times, and shared 1,817 times.

In addition to the counter narratives against Dirty Vote that are popular on TikTok, several pro Dirty Vote narratives were also found, including through the posts of the accounts @gsaroso.id, @onimonicha and @ulasan.official. Just like the keywords used in the pro Dirty Vote narrative on X, the keyword "election fraud" is also used on TikTok.

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Various posts with the narrative "All in 02" also followed alongside #dirtyvote on TikTok. The big narrative were that Dirty Vote was full of lies, and that the movie was even more convincing to vote for Prabowo Gibran.


Figure 17. Counter narrative to the Dirty Vote on TikTok.

From the monitoring findings of the Damai Coalition, the hashtag #pdiperjuangan was the most used hashtag on TikTok, not #dirtyvote. The PDI-P Party, the party with the most seats in Indonesia's national parliament, currently has a TikTok account @dpppdiperjuangan which is followed by 1.4 million people. Of all the content that has been posted on TikTok, @dpppdiperjuangan has received 23.1 million likes. As the winning party of the 2019 General Election, PDIP and the hashtag #pdiperjuangan have the opportunity to be quoted more in news content and other content on social media.

In conclusion, even official campaign accounts registered to the KPU were still disseminating explicit and implicit campaign content during the cooling period. These narratives continued to reverberate during the

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cooling period until one day after voting, and dominated the social media public space along with the three most popular hashtags: namely, #Sirekap, #dirtyvote, and #kecuranganpemilu. These hashtags point to ongoing discourse of a lot of information being disseminated, creating an overload of information from both trustworthy and untrustworthy sources. These hashtags sparked huge discussions in online spaces during the monitoring period.

Based on the Damai Coalition's monitoring, there were five hashtags that were most popular during the quiet period, the voting day, and one day after the voting, namely #Sirekap, #dirtyvote, #kecuranganpemilu, #KamiKabarkanYouPutuskan, and #pdiperjuangan. The following is an overview of the distribution of the five hashtags.

Tabel 5. 5 Top Hashtags during Period of February 11-15, 2024

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#pdiperjuangan	1,300	430	74,000,000

From the table above, we can see that #Sirekap was the most used hashtag on platform X during the period February 11-15. Sirekap is an information system on vote recapitulation managed by KPU. Since @narasitv's post on X about Sirekap on February 9, conversations about Sirekap have gone viral.

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Based on Drone Emprit's analysis of data on X during the period February 14-15, conversations about Sirekap revolved around data conversion errors, data discrepancies between C-Result photos and data displayed in infopemilu.kpu.go.id, opinions of fraud in the system, application shortcomings, lack of transparency in displaying election data, criticism of data integrity, netizen concerns about Sirekap's cybersecurity, and personal experiences of Sirekap users in the field. Not surprisingly, #Sirekap became the most talked about hashtag on X.


Figure 17. The most retweeted post on X regarding Sirekap. Source: Drone Emprit.

The second most talked about hashtag on X, also the most shared on Facebook during the monitoring period was #dirtyvote. Dirty Vote is a documentary film produced by Watchdoc. This film contains an analysis of three constitutional law experts in Indonesia on cases of fraud in the 2024 elections. On the official Dirty Vote Youtube account, the film, which was published on February 11, has been watched 9,863,460 times.

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Based on Drone Emprit's analysis of Dirty Vote during the period of February 10-12, negative and positive sentiments in conversations related to Dirty Vote are almost balanced. In the positive narrative, the film is praised as a film that is able to present factual data on election fraud, reveal the flaws in the election system, is a call to oversee the election process and use voting rights, as well as an expression of defense for the three constitutional law experts who appear in the film.

The film was promoted by many actors, including media outlets Tempo and CNN Indonesia, activists such as Tunggal Pawestri, Alissa Wahid and Ananda Badudu, Nahdlatul Ulama figure Islah Bahrawi, civil society organization @antikorupsi, buzzers of candidate 01 @Mdy_Asmara1701 and @BosPurwa, film review account @HabisNontonFilm, as well as by the account of vice president 01, namely @cakimiNOW, and the official campaign account of candidate 01, @aminajaduluid.


Figure 18. Positive narrative about Dirty Vote on X. Source: Drone Emprit.

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Meanwhile, the criticism of the documentary was also seen. Some has described as , as slander against the government of President Jokowi Widodo and Prabowo, dirty propaganda, disrupting the democratic process, creating uproar and worsening the atmosphere during the calm period, not balanced in presenting facts, exacerbating polarization, and creating confusion in public. X accounts that counter-narrate Dirty Vote include @OfficialDPP_PBB, Deputy Chairman of the Gerindra Party @habiburokhman, Prabowo Gibran's campaign account @dekade_08, Prabowo Gibran's supporting buzzers @PartaiSocmed and @Bull_winner, and Gerindra Party politician @fadlizon.

Figure 19. Counter-narrative to #dirtyvote on X by Prabowo Gibran supporting accounts.

#Dirtyvote was also the third most used hashtag on TikTok during the monitoring period. The TikTok account @dekade_08, a buzzer for Prabowo Gibran, was the most popular account in the Dirty Vote conversation. In the counter-narrative he wrote, the Dirty Vote movie should be suspected as an attempt to provoke the public because it was published during the cooling period. In his counter-narrative post, @dekade_08 also used #prabowogibran #bersamaindonesiamaju #mendingprabowo, and #terusmajubersamaprabowo hashtags. This post was viewed 3.1 million times, and shared 1,817 times.

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In addition to the counter narratives against Dirty Vote that are popular on TikTok, several pro Dirty Vote narratives were also found, including through the posts of the accounts @gsaroso.id, @onimonicha and @ulasan.official. Just like the keywords used in the pro Dirty Vote narrative on X, the keyword "election fraud" is also used on TikTok.

Various posts with the narrative "All in 02" also followed alongside #dirtyvote on TikTok. The big narrative were that Dirty Vote was full of lies, and that the movie was even more convincing to vote for Prabowo Gibran.


Figure 20. Counter narrative to the Dirty Vote on TikTok.

In fact, from the monitoring findings of the Peace Coalition, the hashtag #pdiperjuangan was the most used hashtag on TikTok, not #dirtyvote. The PDI-P Party, the party with the most seats in Indonesia's national parliament, currently has a TikTok account @dpppdiperjuangan which is followed by 1.4 million people. Of all the content that has been posted on

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TikTok, @dpppdiperjuangan has received 23.1 million likes. As the winning party of the 2019 General Election, PDIP and the hashtag #pdiperjuangan have the opportunity to be quoted more in news content and other content on social media.

As a conclusion to this section, first, public spaces on social media during the campaign period, the cooling period, the voting day, and one day after are always filled with conversations that build specific narratives. During the campaign period, three dominant narratives were found, namely the narrative of support for candidate 02 Prabowo Gibran, the narrative of support for candidate 01 Anies-Muhaimin, and the narrative that Prabowo must lose at all cost. Candidate 03 Ganjar-Mahfud also tried to build narratives through special hashtags on various social media platforms, but these narratives were not as dominant or did not get as much interaction as the three narratives previously described.

The second conclusion is that even though the cooling period was imposed, campaign content, both explicit and implicit campaigns, were still disseminated, even by official campaign accounts registered to the KPU. These narratives continued to reverberate during the cooling period until one day after voting, and dominated the social media public space along with the three most popular hashtags, namely #Sirekap, #dirtyvote, and #kecuranganpemilu. For the team and supporters of candidates 01 and 03, the positive narratives of #dirtyvote, negative #Sirekap, and #kecuranganpemilu certainly did not hurt. However, for candidate pair 03, the three hashtags are disadvantageous. Therefore, we found counter-narratives from various actors, which based on our observation, also in line with Drone Emprit's analysis, were strong on TikTok, quite strong on Youtube and Facebook, but minimal on X.

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5. Election education content during campaign and cooling period

In the current digital age, social media can be used as a tool of massive dissemination of information for the public. The Election Management Bodies (EMBs), KPU and Bawaslu, serve as the main information source regarding elections and electoral procedures for the public. In this monitoring period, we examine their use of Facebook and Instagram.

In the period of February 11th to 15th, 2024, Bawaslu posted a total of 39 while KPU posted 42 contents on their Facebook and Instagram accounts (Fig. 18). There is an increase in frequency of posts by KPU leading up to election day (14th of February) in which 69% of KPU's posts and 79.5% of Bawaslu's posts are found to be published during the quiet period (11-13 February) (Fig. 19). During the monitoring period, 60.5% of posts inform the public regarding elections and election procedures (Fig. 20). Moreover, there is generally more of this category during the quiet period and up to election day, rather than posts that include information regarding events (Fig. 21).

Frequency of Posts Based on Social Media Platform

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Figure 18. Frequency of posts based on social media platform

Frequency of posts based on account and date

Legend: ■ Bawaslu RI ■ KPU Republik Indonesia

Figure 19. Frequency of posts based on EMB and date during the monitoring period

Frequency of posts based on category and date

Legend: ■ Information regarding elections and election procedure ■ Event report/others

Figure 20. Frequency of posts based on category during the monitoring period

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Percentage of Posts Based on Category

🔴 Information regarding elections and election procedure 🔵 Event report/others

39.5%

60.5%

Figure 21. Percentage of posts based on category

5.1. Examples of posts

In the current digital age, social media is widely used as a tool of massive dissemination of information. The Indonesian Election Management Bodies (EMBs), in this case KPU (the General Elections Commission) and Bawaslu (the General Election Supervisory Agency), serves as the main information source regarding elections. Therefore, in this monitoring period, we observe how these EMBs use Facebook and Instagram as a platform to share information.

Three types of posts are identified during this monitoring period: 1) information regarding voting procedures, 2) information regarding the election period, 3) content warning the public to refrain from committing election crimes such as voter fraud.

5.1.1. Information regarding voting procedures

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During the "cooling"/quiet period, the EMBs, KPU and Bawaslu, posted information regarding voting procedure. For example, on February 12th, KPU posted an infographic on Facebook with information regarding the specific times both registered and unregistered voters can vote at voting stations during election day. The post gained almost 271 thousand likes and about 37 thousand shares (Fig. 22).


Figure 22. Facebook post by KPU explaining voting times

On another occasion, on February 13th, KPU posted a video on their Facebook account explaining that people who have not yet registered to vote still have the opportunity to do so on election day by presenting their identification card at the designated voting station corresponding to the information on their card. This post gained 23 thousand shares and about 1.9 thousand likes (Fig. 23)

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Figure 23. Facebook post by KPU explaining how unregistered voters can still vote

This particular socialization is vital considering the prevalent disinformation that circulated suggesting that individuals can vote at any polling station by presenting their identification card (e-KTP). This disinformation initially surfaced during the 2019 elections and persisted into the current election cycle, leading to widespread public confusion. Many were unaware of the voter registration period and the requirement to vote at the designated polling station listed on their ID card if unregistered. Despite efforts by the KPU to disseminate information about these regulations, tracking their effectiveness is challenging due to the continued circulation of disinformation, further confusing the public.

Nevertheless, EMBs should persist in utilizing their platform to directly address and counteract the spread of mis-/disinformation regarding elections and voting procedures. By doing so, they can actively combat false information with credible and trustworthy sources, ensuring that the

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public remains accurately informed. This proactive approach would foster public trust and confidence in the electoral system.

5.1.2. Information regarding the election period

Another trend of posts by EMBs identified is a series of posts containing information regarding the different stages of the elections. At the beginning of the "cooling"/quiet period, on February 11th, KPU posted an infographic on Instagram explaining what is to be expected during the "quiet period' and what actions are prohibited to do as in line with Law number 7 of 2017 regarding General Elections (Fig. 24).

Figure 24. Instagram post by KPU explaining the cooling/quiet period

In its role as the supervisory body, Bawaslu shared initial findings of potential irregularities observed during voting and vote counting on election day via Instagram. The post stated that Bawaslu identified 19

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issues related to the voting and vote counting processes during the 2024 elections (Fig. 25)

Figure 25. Instagram post by Bawaslu reporting issues found on election day regarding voting and vote counting

 5.1.3.   EMBs urging the public to refrain from committing election crimes

Prior to election day, Bawaslu posted a series of contents (Fig. 26) the public to refrain from committing election fraud and manipulating the results of the elections (such as by pretending to be someone else and voting more than once). These messages often contain additional details about relevant laws and regulations that may be infringed upon by individuals committing such unlawful actions.

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Figure 26. Instagram posts by Bawaslu urging the public to refrain from committing voter fraud and election crimes

6. Conclusion and Recommendations

A total of 23 disinformation content was fact-checked by Mafindo during the cooling period. During this crucial time before election day, disinformation circulated seemingly with the intent to entice and dissuade support for certain candidates, as well as to confuse the public with false information regarding the electoral process or lower trust of the public towards EMBs. The dissemination of trustworthy information is imperative during the cooling period in order to ensure the smooth conduct of election day and the subsequent processes afterwards.

Furthermore, although campaigning is not allowed during the cooling period, the social media landscape seemed to be far from quiet; through their "hate speech monitoring dashboard", AJI found more than 2100 content related to the 2024 elections that target vulnerable groups during

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this time. Prevalent content targeting vulnerable groups are found to follow ongoing narratives and geopolitical tensions that exist. For example, targeting the disabled community due to the widespread dissemination of false and misleading information regarding disabled voting rights. Furthermore, current geopolitical tensions such as the Israel-Palestine conflict and the issue of Rohingya refugees also became targets of 'hate speech' during this period. Trends of 'hate speech' continues to suggest that the dissemination of disinformation shapes and fuels the discourse of harmful content targeting vulnerable groups/subjects of said disinformation.

Additionally, the role of social media in political campaigning continues to become more prevalent. With the increasing number of young voters, Indonesian politicians look to social media as a main strategy for gaining popularity and voter support. However, regulations governing the use of social media in political campaigns are still lacking and have many shortcomings, making it possible for it to be exploited in detrimental ways. As a way of safeguarding freedom of expression, as well as supporting peaceful and transparent elections, the Damai Coalition drafted a Joint Commitment to ensure the compliance of all election participants towards the rules of social media campaigning.

For example, the KPU regulations have recently been updated to require all candidates and parties to report up to 20 social media accounts per platform. The goal of this regulation is to facilitate the monitoring of social media usage during the campaign period. However, in reality, not all candidates' and parties' social media accounts were reported to the KPU. Our findings urge that all social media accounts used to campaign should be registered in order to streamline the process of monitoring compliance, as per KPU regulations.

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Additionally, KPU regulations state that campaigning on social media is not allowed during the quiet period. However, the definition of 'campaigning' in the regulations is vague, leading candidates and parties to continue posting content that enhances their self-image, despite self-image enhancement being considered 'campaign content' according to their regulations, there have been no concrete consequences enforced by the KPU. Therefore, existing regulations should be revised to clarify the meaning of 'campaigning' in the era of mixed-campaigns; traditional (offline) and online campaigning, in order to create a fair and level playing ground for all candidates.

On the other hand, as voting day approached quickly, EMBs KPU and Bawaslu were active in sharing educational information for the public through their social media channels.

More comprehensive and concrete guidelines should be formed to reflect the rising trend of online political campaigning. While traditional offline campaigning remains relevant, digital campaigning is increasingly important, particularly with the growing number of young voters. The unique characteristics of online campaigning should be considered when developing new regulations for future elections.

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